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ARTICLES 
A HIGHER DUTY: 
A NEW LOOK AT THE 
ETHICS OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER 
T HE coRPORATE LAWYER woRKS IN a complex world of finance and con-voluted business transactions involving intricate, ambiguous, and con-
stantly evolving law. It is a world in which few significant transactions 
can be concluded without his active participation; he is an indispensible 
link in the chain. It is a world of "other people's money."1 
The effects of corporate action by public and large private corpora-
tions are often so substantial that they reach beyond the confines of the 
business world and into the general community. Thus the lawyer per-
forming a vital role in the corporate world can no longer disclaim respon-
sibility for the results of his actions on the pretext that he is merely exe-
cuting the desires of his client. And one would hope that while he 
executes his legal function in the best interests of his client, he does so 
without offending the mores of the public. 
Although it has not always been clear to the legal profession that the 
conduct of its most powerful clients affects ethical responsibilities, the re-
sulting problems have become more evident in recent years to the courts, 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and members of the 
bar. Moreover, there is what might be termed the evolving "Watergate 
principle" - that there are matters of significant public concern in which 
a lawyer may have an even greater duty to the citizenry than to his 
client. Recent developments have been diffuse, and include a changing 
legal conceptualization of corporations as well as numerous considera-
tions involved in corporate legal representation. Viewed together and 
placed into focus, these developments shed considerable light on the 
sometimes conflicting duties of the corporate lawyer to clients and to the 
public. While some of these ethical questions are of interest to all 
attorneys, the current ethical dilemmas of the lawyer representing pub-
lic corporations and the corporate specialist dealing in matters relating 
to the federal securities acts2 can be especially acute. 
The legal establishment has resisted any changes in the duty of a law-
• A.B., New York University; J.D., Harvard; LL.M., New York University; Member, New 
York and Virginia Bars; Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School 
of Law. 
1 See L. BRANDEIS, OrnER PEoPLE's MoNEY (1933). 
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. H 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. ~§ 78a-78kk (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. H 80a-1 to -52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Invest-
ment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
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yer as articulated in the Code of Professional Responsibility,3 producing 
potential conflicts with evolving developments in the courts and the SEC, 
as well as rising public expectations. However, as former Commissioner 
Sommers suggested, "the security bar's conception of its role too sharply 
contrasts with the reality of its role in the securities process . . . and in 
such situations the reality eventually prevails. . . . I would suggest that 
the bar will make a serious error if it seeks to defend itself against the 
emerging trends by reliance upon old shibboleths and axioms. Society 
will not stand for it. "4 This article will analyze recent developments and 
endeavor to offer some solutions to the ethical conflict by proposed 
changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
I. THE CORPORATE LAWYER 
The lawyer's traditional role as an adversary representing a clearly 
identifiable client with undivided loyalty is reflected in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility,5 with the underlying presumption that by such 
service the lawyer best serves society.6 This description and the under-
lying presumption are not consistent with the modern practice of a cor-
porate lawyer, economic reality, or recent legal developments. 
The practice of the lawyer representing public corporations is unique. 
He represents corporations whose shares are held by members of the pub-
lic, either directly as shareholders or indirectly as participants in mutual 
funds, retirement plans, or the like7 and whose activities affect both large 
numbers of employees and the national economy.8 In his representation 
a corporate lawyer rarely functions in an adversary position, particularly 
where legal opinions or disclosure problems involving the securities acts 
are concerned. Although attorneys for an issuer9 and underwriter10 in a 
public offering may have honest differences concerning the contents of a 
registration statement, they have a common interest in consummating the 
3 See text accompanying note 121 and Part IV B of the text infra. 
4 Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Law-
yer, (1973-1974) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1179,631, at 83,689, 83,691. 
5 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics [hereinafter 
ABA Code] EC 5-18 states in part that "a lawyer employed or retained by a corporation 
or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to the stockholder, director, 
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity." 
6 ABA Code Preamble. 
7 See New York Stock Exchange, Shareownership - 1970, Census of Shareowners (un-
dated pamphlet). 
6 Two examples will illustrate the significance of public corporations. In 1976 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. had consolidated sales and revenu~s of $33 billion, 
927,000 employees, and 3,500,000 shareholders. Moooy's Pusuc UTIUTY MANUAL 117, 
121 (1977). General Motors Corp. had consolidated sales and revenues of $47 billion, 
748,000 employees, and 1,300,000 shareholders. 1 Moooy's lNoUSTRIAL MANUAL 725, 727 
(1976). 
9 An issuer is defined in section 2(4) of the 1933 Act to include every person (in-
cluding a corporation) "who issues or proposes to issue any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b-4 
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
10 An underwriter is defined in section 2(11) of the 1933 Act to include "any person 
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in con-
nection, with the distribution of a security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b-ll (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
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offering and avoiding a common liability under section II of the 1933 
Act.11 Similarly, in a merger the proxy statement12 is prepared jointly 
by counsel and is almost identical for both corporate parties, since both 
corporations must meet essentially the same legal requirements under 
the securities acts.13 Again there is a mutual interest in effectuating the 
transaction and avoiding liabilities since the merged corporation will be 
liable for all obligations of both corporations. In these common examples, 
the interests of the clients are parallel; they succeed or fail together, and 
their attorneys are in effect attorneys for the situation. When an attorney 
prepares or reviews a proxy statement, a press release, an annual report 
to shareholders,14 or an annual report to the SEC on form 10K,15 there is 
no second party at all. Moreover, these legal problems are largely ones 
of disclosure to the public, requiring an act which the lawyer could under-
take himself, in lieu of and independently of his client, if he possessed the 
information and it were proper to do so either by advising the SEC or 
otherwise.16 
The corporate lawyer is often indispensible to the consummation of a 
transaction, particularly when a legal opinion is a customary condition of 
closing17 as in a merger, 18 public offering19 or sale of restricted se-
11 Section ll(a) provides in part: 
In case any part of the registration statement when such becomes effective, 
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein 
not misleading, any person acquiring such a security ... may, either at law or in 
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction sue-
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; 
(2) every person who was a director of . . . the issuer at the time of the 
filing of the part of the. registration statement with respect to which his liability 
is asserted; 
(4) every accountant ... or an appraiser whose profession gives authority 
to a statement made by him who has with his consent been named as having 
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement or as having prepared or 
certified any report . . . which is used in connection with the registration statement, 
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report . . . , which 
purports to have been prepared or certified by him; 
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security. 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
12 The requirements of a proxy statement are codified in Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-101 (1977), passed pursuant to section 14(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) with respect to securities registered under section 12 of 
the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
13 Schedule 14 A, Item 14, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1977). 
14 Under rules passed pursuant to the 1934, .ct, an annual report to shareholders must be sent 
to all shareholders in connection with an annual meeting of shareholders at which directors are to 
be elected. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3(b), C-2(a} (1977). 
1s 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1977). 
16 See In re Emanual Fields. Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), 
[1973] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 79,407; Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., The Commission 
and the Bar: Forty Good Years, quoted in Matthews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAw. 105, 119-21 (1975). 
17 See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 {2d Cir. 1964). 
18 See note 106 infra. 
19 See Schneider and Manko, Going Public - Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 
15 VIL. L. REV. 283, 295 {1970). 
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curities.20 Moreover, the importance of the lawyer's role in the prepara-
tion of SEC registration statements is emphasized in the following 
reflections of A. A. Sommer: 
[The registration statement] has always been a lawyer's docu-
ment and with very, very rare exceptions the attorney has been 
the field marshall who coordinated the activities of others en-
gaged in the registration process, wrote (or at least rewrote) most 
of the statement, made the judgments with regard to the inclu-
sion or exclusion of information on the grounds of materiality, 
compliance with registration form requirements, necessities of 
avoiding omission of disclosure necessary to make those matters 
stated not misleading. . . . With the exception of the financial 
statements, virtually everything else in the registration statement 
bears the imprint of counsel. 21 
The central role of the corporate lawyer is further emphasized by the 
philosophy of self-regulation as "the mainspring of the federal securities 
laws."22 The SEC exercises no supervisory functio~ in such important 
areas as private offerings, sales of securities pursuant to Rule 144,23 
annual reports to shareholders, and press releases. Even when it does 
assume an active role, as in the processing of registration statements or 
proxy material, the SEC does not make an independent examination of 
the facts but basically relies upon the information contained in the docu-
ments furnished to it, 24 which are primarily the work of lawyers and 
accountants. ·The resources of the SEC are too meager for it to be other-
wise.25 This situation has made the "courts alert to provide such 
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose,"26 
so that the Supreme Court has allowed private remedies for violation of 
the proxy rules27 and Rule lOb-5,28 despite the absence of an express statu-
tory right to bring a private civil action.29 This system of self-regula-
tion will not function without the cooperation of the bar, and, therefore, 
"the task of enforcing the securities law rests in overwhelming measure 
on the bar's shoulders,"30 and places upon the securities bar a rigorous 
standard of professional honor. 
Finally, the SEC has consciously adopted a program to improve pro-
20 See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). 
21 See Speech of A. A. Sommer, Jr., supra note 4, at 83,688. 
22 Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
23 17 C.F.R. § 230-144 (1977). 
24 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). 
25 See In re Emanual Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, (June 18, 1973), (1973] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 79,407, at 83,175. 
26 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964). 
27 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
26 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
29 Id. See also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Kardon v. Nat'(. 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E. D. Pa. 1946). 
30 In re Emanual Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973) [1973] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11-79,407, at 83,175. 
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fessional performance in the belief that "[e]ven if certain businessmen 
are not moved to full compliance by ethical considerations or the fear of 
punishment, they will do far less damage if their lawyer and accountants 
won't play"31 the game of business without regard for the law. 
II. THE CoRPORATE ATTORNEY's DUTY 
A. Identification of the Client 
The starting point for an analysis of the ethical duties of a corporate 
lawyer must be the identification of his client. For most lawyers this is 
obvious, but for the corporate lawyer the matter may not be so simple, 
the difficulty being in the unique structure and nature of a corporation. A 
corporation is an artificial entity created by law, operated by officers 
and employees, and under the management of a board of directors for the 
benefit of the shareholders. The shareholders elect the directors who 
select the president32 who in turn customarily retains and discharges 
counsel. Who then is the lawyer's client? Is it the corporate entity in 
whose name the lawyer acts, the directors who manage the corporation, 
the shareholders who own the corporation, or the president who has 
hired and can fire the attorney?33 Client identification appears to be 
the key to much of the difficulty encountered by the SEC in dealing with 
the professional conduct of securities lawyers. 34 
Normally, numerous interests of the parties comprising the corporation 
are intertwined, and the lawyer is said to represent the "corporate en-
tity."35 This is an overly simplified fiction which does not stand 
analysis. For example, when the lawyer of a solvent, profitable corpora-
tion assists in a dissolution, or a merger in which the corporation will 
not be the survivor, he is not acting in the best interests of the corporate 
entity, but presumably that of its shareholders. 
B. Changing Legal Conceptualizations of the Corporation 
As long as the entity theory persisted undiminished, the question 
whether a corporate lawyer owed any duty to the shareholders of his cor-
porate client could not be asked. The recognition of shareholders as a 
separate legal component not always subsumed within the corporate 
entity came first in civil litigation under section lOb of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193436 and Rule lOb-5.37 For example, in Pappas v. 
31 See Speech of R. Garrett, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws, 
quoted in 30 Bus. LAw. 118, 119 (Special Issue, March, 1975). 
32 See, e.g., DEL. ConE tit. 8, §§ 104, 141, 142, 211 (1974). It is the practice of some 
corporations for the board of directors to approve the retention of counsel who is never-
theless chosen by the chief executive officer. 
33 See Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L. J. 371, 374. 
~ See Speech of R. Garrett, Jr., supra note 31. 
35 See note 5 supra. 
36 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange-
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Moss38 the board of directors of a listed company, all but one of whom 
were officers, and who in the aggregate owned more than fifty percent 
of the outstanding stock, issued a large block of the shares of the com-
pany's common stock to themselves at a fraudulently low price. Plain-
tiff, a minority shareholder, alleged in a derivative action on behalf of the 
corporation39 that they were guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the 
sale, a direct violation of Rule lOb-5.40 The defendants argued that the 
corporation could only act through its agents, and that all of its agents, 
the directors, were aware of the facts so that the corporation was not 
deceived.41 The Third Circuit found the required deception by viewing 
the fraud "as though the 'independent' stockholders were standing in 
place of the defrauded corporate entity at the time the original resolution 
authorizing the stock sale was passed."42 Certainly, it was pointed out, 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
37 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) _ To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). 
Promulgated under section 10 of the 1934 Act, see note 35 supra, Ruie 10b-5 has 
become the basic provision of the 1934 Act to prevent fraud in the purchase and sale 
of securities and has been broadly construed to effect its remedial purpose. See Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971). The SEC is given a right to 
bring actions under section 21 of the 1934 Act, 15 U .S.C.§ 78u (1970), and a private right of action 
has been inferred from the rule. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 
(1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.1946). The core of the rule is 
that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities 
transactions, be· subject to equal market risk, and have equal access to material information 
available to insiders. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968). 
38 393 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1968); See also Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
39 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1, which sets forth the conditions for bringing a derivative 
action in the federal courts: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders . . . to enforce a 
right of a corporation . . . , the corporation . . . having failed to enforce a right 
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall 
allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder ... at the time of the transaction 
of which he complains. . . . The derivative action may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests 
of the shateholders . . . similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corpora-
tion. 
40 Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3rd Cir. 1968). 
41 l d. at 869. 
42Jd. 
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"the deception of the independent stockholders is no less real because 
'formalistically' the corporate entity was the victim of the fraud."43 
A similar fracturing of the corporate entity was reached by the Second 
Circuit in Sehoenbaum v. Firstbrook,44 in which the complaint in the de-
rivative action alleged that defendants, the directors of Banff Oil, Ltd., 
knowing of oil discoveries by Banff, conspired to sell to its controlling 
corporate shareholder, Aquitaine Company of Canada, Ltd., the other 
defendant, shares of stock of Banff at vastly inadequate prices.45 The 
Second Circuit, sitting en bane, overruled a panel decision and held 
that the complaint stated a triable claim under Rule 10b-5, even though 
all of the directors were aware of the facts. 48 In his dissenting panel 
opinion, Judge Hays, who wrote the majority en bane opinion, dealt with 
the corporate entity question and stated that "[e]ndowing a corporation 
with a fictitious 'personality,' so that for example it has 'knowledge' is a 
useful device for the analysis of many problems. But it can also consti-
tute a trap for the unwary when they ascribe reality to the fictions. . . . 
There is, of course, no justification for interposing the corporate fiction 
between the directors and the minority stockholders who were the victims 
of the directors' fraudulent actions."47 
With a similar disregard for the unitary corporate entity, the Supreme 
Court in ].1. Case v. Borak48 combined the rights of a group of share-
holder of J .I. Case Company brought an action alleging that a consummated 
holders to create a derivative corporate cause of action.49 A stock-
merger with American Tractor Corporation was effected through the use 
of a false and misleading proxy statement in violation of Section 14a of 
the 1934 Act.50 The Supreme Court held that section 27 of the 1934 Act 
authorized a derivative and a direct private federal cause of action for 
violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act by the complaining stockholder, 
stating that "[t]he injury which a stockholder suffers from corporate 
action pursuant to a deceptive proxy solicitation ordinarily flows from 
the damage done the corporation, rather than the damage inflicted di-
rectly upon the stockholder. The damage suffered results not from the 
deceit practiced on him alone but rather from the deceit practiced on 
the stockholders as a group. ro hold that derivative actions are not 
within the sweep of the section would be tantamount to a denial of pri-
vate relief."51 The Court held that the statute granted such a derivative 
43Jd. 
44 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.) (rehearing en bane}, rev'g in part 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475 n. 15 (1977) (citing the foregoing cases and Pappas v. Moss, 
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) with apparent approval}. 
45 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968). 
46 Id. at 219. 
47 405 F.2d 200, 215. 
48 377 u.s. 426 (1964). 
49 Id. at 432. 
50 I d. at 4~. 
51 I d. at 432. 
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right despite the absence of a specific reference to a private right of ac-
tion in section 14(a).s2 
C. Duty to Shareholders 
The trend in the federal courts to disregard the corporate entity in 
favor of treating the rights of shareholders independently when the cir-
cumstances require has application to the relationship of a corporate 
attorney to his client, although the Code of Professional Responsibility 
of the American Bar Association has and continues to postulate that the 
corporate entity alone is always the lawyer's client.53 The ABA position 
was specifically rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Garner v. W olfin-
barger,54 in which access to communications between the attorney for 
the corporation and its officers was sought in a derivative suit charging 
the corporation and its officers with acts injurious to the interest of the 
plaintiffs as stockholders.55 The defendant objected to the disclosure on 
the grounds of attorney-client privilege.56 
Taking note of the ABA brief presented as amicus the court could not 
accept that "prospective decision of the client on whether to abide by 
advice or disregard it, or the guarantee of a veil of secrecy, either 
establishes or narrows the attorney's obligation in giving advice. And to 
grant to corporate management plenary assurance of secrecy for opinions 
received is to encourage it to disregard with impunity the advice 
sought."57 Nor did the Fifth Circuit find "[c]onceptualistic phrases de-
scribing the corporation as an entity separate from its stockholders" a use-
ful tool of analysis, for it served only "to obscure the fact that management 
has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders.''56 
Therefore, if all the shareholders wished to inquire into a communication 
between the corporation's representatives and the company's attorney 
they would clearly have a right to do so. 59 When a minority shareholder 
seeks access to the communication, then discretion must be exercised by 
the court in granting such access to protect the interests of the other 
shareholders. 60 
The court was also persuaded that two traditional exceptions to the 
attorney-client privilege were pertinent: communications in contempla-
52 Id. at 431. 
53 See note :;; supra. 
54 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). See also 
Bailey v. Meister Brau, 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972). Cf. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 
F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975), where the court held that the attorney for defendant-majority 
·shareholders, who was also a member of the Board of Directors of the same corporation, 
could not protect defendant by claiming privileged communications at the expense of· his 
corporate clients, the plaintiH-minority shareholders. 
55 Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d at 1095. 
58 Id. at 1096. 
57 Id. at 1102. 
58 Id. at 1101. 
59 Id. 
eo Id. at 1101 n. 17. 
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tion of a crime or fraud,61 and communications to a joint attorney.62 
The latter exception was found to apply on the theory that counsel was 
acting on behalf of or at least for the benefit of the shareholders as well 
as the corporate entity.63 
The logic of the Fifth Circuit has a broader implication for the cor-
porate attorney-client relationship than the question of privilege, par-
ticularly with respect to the voluntary disclosure of pertinent matters to 
the shareholders by counsel under appropriate circumstances. A public 
corporation is not an end or an entity unto itself, but a means to an end 
through the organization of capital for a large number of shareholders 
who are the sole owners of the corporation. 64 If this position is correct 
and the shareholders are therefore the ultimate client of counsel to a pub-
lic corporation, then it is reasonable to propose that the SEC and the 
courts adopt as a public policy the assumption that shareholders expect 
their company to be run in a lawful manner. If the corporation acting 
through its board of directors or management does not meet that expec-
tation, it is a breach of the shareholders' trust. A corporate attorney 
should have a duty to fulfill the expectation of integrity of his ultimate 
client, the shareholders. When that expectation fails because of cor-
porate misconduct as to a material matter, the attorney should have a duty 
to disclose these facts to the shareholders. When there are a large num-
ber of shareholders, direct communication may not be possible, and in 
any event such widely disseminated information would quickly become 
public. In view of the impracticality of direct disclosure, the attorney 
should be obliged instead to make appropriate disclosures to the SEC or 
other authorities, at least as to matters that are breaches of law or would 
be breaches of law if not disclosed, and if it is clear the corporation 
through its directors or officers will not make the required disclosure. 
Under this theory, the attorney-client privilege would not be applicable to 
such disclosure situations.65 Moreover, the attorney's duty to the cor-
poration's shareholders and his duty to the public are likely to be 
congruous.66 
D. Duty to Public 
For the past decade a doctrine has been developing cautiously in the 
securities law that a corporate lawyer may have a duty not only to his 
client, whomever that may be, but to the general public, or at least the 
investing public, as well. 67 
61 Id. at 1102. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1103. 
64 Id. at 1101. Shareholders elect directors, must approve any charter amendments, 
mergers, dissolutions, etc., and alone are entitled to all of the net profits and net assets 
of the corporation. See, e.g., ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act§§ 34, 54, 67, 77, 80. 
65 See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra. 
66 See part III D of the text infra. 
67 For a discussion of the traditional viewpoint of the duty of a securities lawyer, see 
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The first significant assertion of the attorney's duty to others beside 
his corporate client occurred in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.68 
This was an action for damages under section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933 (1933 Act) 69 against the BarChris Corporation and its officers, 
directors, accountants, and attorneys. The suit was brought by pur-
chasers of BarChris debentures in a public offering, who alleged and 
proved that the company's registration statement contained materially 
false and misleading statements.70 The court first noted the long-
standing position of the bar, accepted by the SEC, that the lawyer pre-
paring a registration statement is not liable under section ll(a)(4) of the 
1933 Act71 for the material prepared by him, although the accountant was 
~iable as an expert with respect to his audit.72 The court then considered 
the liability of Grant, an outside director, signer of the BarChris regis-
tration statement, and partner of the law firm responsible for its prep-
aration. Grant had asserted a due diligence defense73 under section 
ll(b)(3).74 In disallowing the defense, the court found that more was 
required of Grant in the way of reasonable investigation than could be 
fairly expected of an outside director who had no connection with the 
preparation of the registration statement.75 Such an outside director, 
one who was not an officer of BarChris, would at a minimum have had to 
read the prospectus with care, and to make some investigation of its 
accuracy with the diligence a prudent man would employ in the manage-
ment of his own property.76 Grant, who as counsel for BarChris prepared 
the registration statement, should not have relied solely upon the officers 
of the corporation, but should have at least checked those matters easily 
verifiable and tested oral information against the original written record 
including minutes and material contracts.77 Had he made such a reason-
Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 
412, 413 (1974). 
68 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
69 See note 11 supra. See also Lowenfels, supra note 66, at 428. 
70 283 F. Supp. at 652. 
71 See note 11 supra. 
72 283 F. Supp. at 683. 
73 I d. at 682, 683. 
74 15 U.S.C. § 77 K(b)(3) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) sets forth the due dilligence which 
expulpates directors, but not the issuer, from section 11(a) of the 1933 Act for false and 
misleading statements contained in a registration statement: 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) no person, other than 
the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the burden of 
proof-
(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting 
to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a copy of or 
extract from a report or . . . of an expert, . . . he had, after reasonable in-
vestigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such 
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein 
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be 
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading; 
75 283 F. Supp. at 690. 
76 Id. at 688. 
77 Id. at 690-92. 
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able independent investigation of the non-expertised portion of the 
prospectus, he would have uncovered many of the false and misleading 
statements or omissions.78 The fact that Grant honestly believed the 
registration statement to be true and that no material facts had been 
omitted was insufficient. 79 While this is technically a decision relating to 
Grant's due diligence defense as a director, his duty as a director to mem-
bers of the purchasing public was broadened because of his function in 
preparing the registration statement as an attorney for the registrant. 80 
As Judge McLean pointed out, this was not a malpractice suit. Grant's 
obligation did not necessarily run only to the client corporation, but also 
to those members of the public at large who as purchasers of the deben-
tures had a cause of action against Grant as a director.81 
The court in BarChris treated Grant as an outside director with special 
responsibilities. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.82 
which strongly relied on BarChris, however, the court considered a 
due diligence defense asserted by a lawyer in an action under section 11 of 
the 1933 ActB3 for false and misleading statements in a registration 
statement used in connection with an acquisition. The court treated the 
lawyer as an inside director because of his close involvement as counsel 
with his client's affairs.84 The standard of due diligence for an inside 
director is so high that as a practical matter his liability approaches that 
of a guarantor of the accuracy of the registration statement.85 Counsel 
in this case was involved in all aspects of the acquisition from the pre-
liminary stages to the conclusion of the transaction, and was directly 
responsible for the preparation of the registration statement.86 Thus 
again, a lawyer's legal role altered his obligations not to his clients, but 
to the plaintiff purchasers under section 11 of the 1933 Act.87 Lawyers 
have generally accepted the application of the BarChris standards of 
diligence even when they are not directors. 
In the same year that BarChris was decided, the Second Circuit in 
SEC v. Frank88 reviewed what appears to be the first instance in which 
78 Id. 
79 I d. at 690. 
8o Id. 
8t Id. 
82 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) .. 
83 15 U.S.C. § 77 K(b)(3)(A) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
84 332 F. Supp. at 576. 
85 I d. at 579. 
86 I d. at 576. 
87 The court did not speak of the lawyer's liability qua lawyer. However, the difference 
in the standard of care expected of an outsider director and an outside director who is 
also counsel for the company is an indication of the care owed by the attorney to the 
public who relied on the prospectus he prepared, and to the corporate issuer which may 
have relied on the attorney to perform his functions in such a way as to avoid liability for 
his client. See STAFF REPORT OF THE SEC ro 11fE SPEaAL SUBOOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGA-
TIONS OF THE CoMMITI'EE oN INTEflSTATE AND FoREIGN CoMMERCE, THE FINANCIAL CoL-
LAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL CoMPANY 113 (Subcomm. Reprint 1972), which discusses 
one company's policy of nondisclosure of financial liabilities. 
88 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d tn7 
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the SEC obtained an injunction against an attorney for alleged violations 
of the fraud provisions of the securities law based upon his "participa-
tion in the preparation of an allegedly misleading offering circular or 
prospectus"89 in connection with a public offering of securities. The 
defendant contended that the alleged misrepresentations had been fur-
nished to him by the officers of his client, and that he had been no more 
than a scrivener placing the ideas in proper form. The court rejected 
this argument.90 A lawyer may not properly assist in the preparation of 
an offering circular or prospectus which he knows to be false simply 
because the misinformation was furnished to him by his client.91 At the 
other extreme, the court found it unreasonable to hold a lawyer respon-
sible for reasonable technical errors in the explanation of a chemical pro-
cess he was describing.92 What the attorney should have known was a more 
difficult question.93 If the information is of a kind that even a non-expert 
should recognize as false, then the lawyer must refrain from using it.94 The 
court did not establish guidelines as to how far such a lawyer should go when 
preparing an offering circular or registration statement to run down possible 
infirmities in his client's story of which he has been put on notice.95 
Obviously, the grounds for the injunction in Frank were nota breach of duty 
by the lawyer to his client, whose wishes he carried out too well, but a breach 
of duty to the offerees and purchasers of his client's securities.96 
In 1973 the Second Circuit again examined the duty of a securities 
lawyer in SEC v. Spectrum Ltd.91 As a result of a merger pursuant to 
Rule 133 under the 1933 Act,98 one of the shareholders of the acquired 
company received a substantial block of unregistered stock of Spectrum. 
The shareholder retained Schiffman, an attorney who was not familiar 
(2d Cir. 1972), in which an attorney prepared false visa petitions on behalf of aliens who 
had entered into sham marriages in order to gain entry into the United States. He was 
convicted of aiding and abetting others to make false statements, because the petitions 
were prepared with a reckless disregard of whether the statements in the petition were 
true, and with a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth, despite a contention that 
such a rule alters the lawyer-client relation. 
89 388 F.2d at 488. The Second Circuit reversed on procedural grounds and returned 
the case to the district court for further findings of fact. Id. at 493. 
90 I d. at 488-89. 
91 /d. at 489 (citing United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
92Jd. 
93 Id. 
94Jd. 
95Jd. 
98 ld. at 488. 
97 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). 
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1976). Rule 133 provided that for purposes of section 5 of 
the 1933 Act only, certain mergers would not be deemed to involve a sale or offer to sell 
securities of the surviving corporation to the security holders of the disappearing corpora-
tion. The rule provided that controlling persons of the constituent corporations could not, 
except for certain limited amounts, publicly sell their securities in the surviving corpora-
tion (whether previously owned or received on the merger) without registration under 
the 1933 Act. The defendant counsel's opinion in Spectrum incorrectly opined that a 
shat'eholder (who in fact was a controlling shat'eholder in a constitutent corporation) 
could publicly sell his share without registration. 
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with the merger, to write an opinion letter on the legality of the sale of 
the proposed stock. After making some preliminary inquiries Schiffman 
wrote an opinion letter addressed to his client, which was subsequently 
furnished by the client to a broker to facilitate the illegal sale of his 
unregistered securities - a violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.99 The 
SEC alleged that Schiffman was therefore an aider and abettor of the 
illicit sale and that it was not necessary to show actual knowledge plus an 
intent to further the improper scheme. 100 On appeal the Second Circuit 
held that the imposition of a mere negligence standard was appropriate, 
at least in an injunction proceeding, because "[t]he legal profession 
plays a unique and pivotal role in the implementation of the securities 
law . . . and the smooth functioning of the securities markets will be 
seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered 
by an attorney when he renders an opinion on such matters."101 Here 
again, the alleged violation of the lawyer's duty was not to the attorney's 
client but to the public. 
These ideas were even more broadly stated in SEC v. National Student 
Marketing Corp. (NSMC),102 where the SEC sought an injunction against 
attorney Robert Katz for aiding and abetting the violation of the anti-
fraud and reporting sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.103 Katz had 
rendered an opinion letter which stated that title to, and risk of loss of, a 
subsidiary of NSMC which was losing money had passed to the purchasers 
on August 29, 1969, although the agreement for the sale of stock of the 
subsidiary was not executed until that November. 104 The opinion was 
written by Katz as attorney for the purchasers, but addressed to NSMC, the 
99 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970). See 489 F.2d at 538-40. 
100 489 F.2d at 540-41. Cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(in which the defendant attorney's role was sometimes more than that of an attorney and 
he was aware his legal opinions would be used to perpetrate a fraud). 
101 489 F.2d at 541. But cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (in 
which the Supreme Court held that a professional is not civilly liable under Rule lOb-5 
of the Securities Exchange Act for negligence, but left open the questions of civil liability 
for reckless conduct, and injunctive relief for negligence under the rule). In SEC v. 
World Radio Mission, Inc., 554 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1976), decided after Ernst & Ernst, 
the court held that scienter is not required for injunctive relief for violations of Rule 
lOb-5. However, of the cases cited in part III of the text, only SEC v. National Student 
Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973) relies at all on Rule lOb-5. 
102 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975). 
103 Id. at 642-43. Katz allegedly violated section l7(a) of the 1933 Act, which reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by 
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in in-
terstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(!) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which op-
erates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Katz was also accused of aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 
lOb-5 (see note 37 supra for the text of the rule) and of the corporate reporting require-
ments of section l3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
104 402 F. Supp. at 644-45. 
350 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:325 
selling corporation. Its purpose was, as Katz allegedly knew, to allow 
NSMC's accountants to exclude the losses of the subsidiary from NSMC 
financials for the three-month period between August, 1969, and the 
date of the NSMC financial statements. In denying a motion by Katz 
for summary judgment, the court said that even if Katz's legal opinion 
was technically correct, as it appears it may have been, "[l]awyers are 
not free to ignore the commercial substance of a transaction which could 
obviously be misleading to stockholders and the investing public. . . . 
Katz's focus on the narrow legal questions on which he opined is unreal-
istic in view of his participation in the total transaction which obviously 
had the possibility for [sic] misleading outsiders."105 
Thus it appears from the above that the courts, sometimes prodded by 
the SEC, have begun to recognize that the duty of a lawyer runs not only 
to the corporate entity but to its shareholders106 and at least in certain 
circumstances to the public, that such duty includes a standard of due 
care, and that this duty sometimes supercedes the privilege protecting 
confidential communications between a client and his attorney. 
E. Conflicts between the Duties to the Client and the Public 
The duty of care to exercise due diligence and proper ethical conduct 
which runs from a corporate lawyer to the public may be an expansion of 
his obligations inconsistent with the duty owed to his corporate client.107 
Conflict may arise, for example, when there are purportedly privileged 
communications, 108 or where the public good and the good of the cor-
poration as an entity do not coincide. The SEC maintained that the public 
good must come first in another aspect of their proceedings against 
NSMC.109 The agency alleged violations of the anti-fraud,110 proxy,lll 
105 Id. at 647 (emphasis added). 
106 See Parts III A-D of the text for a survey of the trend toward establishing a duty 
of care owed by the corporate attorney to both the stockholders and the public at large. 
107 An attorney normally advises his client how to conform to the law, including the 
securities acts, advice completely consistent with his obligations to the public. See 
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, STATEMENT OF POUCY REGARDING RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
LIABILITIES OF LA WYERS IN ADVISING WITH RESPECT TO THE CoMPUANCE BY CUENTS 
WITH LAws ADMINISTERED BY THE SEC (adopted Aug. 12, 1975), reprinted in 31 Bus. 
LAw. 543, 545 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA STATEMENT OF Poucr REGARDING 
SEC CoMPUANCE]. The difficulty arises only if the attorney is in error through negligence 
or otherwise, or the client refuses to follow his advice. The lawyer's concern about his 
personal exposure for negligence has been ameliorated somewhat by Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See note 101 supra. 
108 See Part IV of the text infra. 
109 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973), and SEC 
v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975), both derive from the 
same Commission complaint but relate to different transactions of NSMC. A settlement 
of the Commission's action was entered into between the Commission and White & Case, 
one of the attorney defendants, which by its terms did not constitute an admission by 
White & Case and pursuant to which they have agreed to undertake certain remedial in-
ternal procedures with respect to their practice of securities law in general, and repre-
sentation of National Student Marketing Corporation in particular. As part of the stipu-
lation, White & Case agreed in connection with any transaction involving the issuance of 
securities to the puqlic: (1) not to deliver with respect thereto an opinion if it has knowl-
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and reporting112 sections of the securities laws in a merger context. 
The defendants were both public companies which were subject to the 
proxy rules of the Exchange Act. 113 The merger agreement contained 
the customary clause that, as a condition of the closing, an opinion letter 
would be supplied to Interstate, the acquired corporation, stating that 
NSMC had taken all steps necessary to consummate the merger, and that 
to the knowledge of counsel there was no violation of any federal or 
state statute or regulation. 114 The merger was approved as required by 
the shareholders of both corporations on the basis of proxy material fur-
nished to them by their respective corporations and prepared by coun-
sel.115 At the closing, a proposed closing letter from the accountant 
required by the agreement contained certain reservations, indicating that 
instead of the nine-month profit of approximately $700,000 reflected in 
the NSMC financial statements in the proxy materials, adjustments 
would have to be made which would show a net loss of approximately 
$80,000 for the period.116 Despite this information, which allegedly 
neither counsel passed on to its client, counsel delivered their required 
opinions and the merger was consummated.117 
The SEC alleged that the lawyers should not have permitted the clos-
ing to occur, and should have insisted that the financial statements be 
revised and the shareholqers resolicited. If their clients still wished to pro-
ceed without such disclosure to the shareholders, counsel should have 
abandoned their representation and advised the SEC.U8 It should be 
noted that in each instance the opinion of counsel was not delivered to 
edge that any material representation made by a client is not true and correct in material 
respects; (2) that if the firm becomes aware of any false or misleading misrepresenta-
tion or warranty by the client, it will advise the client of the clients' disclosure obliga-
tions under the Federal Securities Laws; and (3) if the client does not take appropriate 
action to comply with such obligation, to consider the need to withdraw from employ-
,ment or take other appropriate action. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp. (1977) 
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~96,027. 
110 Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See note 
103 supra. 
Ill Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
This section prohibits solicitation of proxies for any security registered under section 12 
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), in contravention of the rules 
of the Commission. See note 12 supra. 
112 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V 
1975). 
113 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
114 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 289 (D.D.C. 1973). 
11s Id. 
116 Id. at 289-90. 
117 Id. at 290. However, the materiality of the adverse financial statements in the 
accountant's letter to the stockholders of NSMC is open to some question, since the 
financials tended to make the terms of the merger more attractive, if anything, to the 
shareholders of NSMC. It is questionable, moreover, whether a reasonable shareholder 
of NSMC who had approved the merger would consider the omitted facts important in 
deciding how to vote, while the shareholders of Interstate clearly should have been re-
solicited. See TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), where an omitted 
fact from a proxy statement was found to be material if there was a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact important in deciding how to vote. 
118 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, '1m (D.D.C. 19'73). 
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its own client but to the other party to the merger. The above charges 
arose out of the performance of counsel as lawyers in the exercise of 
their professional judgment, 119 and were characterized in a memorandum 
by defendant's counsel as a "breach of the most fundamental ethical and 
professional obligation of counsel."12° Certainly, this appears to have 
been the first time that such an allegation had been asserted by the 
government in an action against counsel, 121 and may be inconsistent 
with an attorney's responsibilities as set forth in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility .122 Nevertheless, the court denied motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim and for summary judgment on the grounds 
that the acts with which they were charged, if performed with an aware-
ness that the financial statements were false and misleading, could have 
been a knowing and willful violation of the securities laws.123 This 
would seem to be a sound decision, and while neither the complaints nor 
the court's opinion is clear on this point, they seem to assert a duty on the 
part of Interstate's counsel both to the shareholders of their client Inter-
state and to NSMC, and a comparable duty by NSMC's counsel to share-
holders of both corporations, not to permit either party to the merger to 
violate the securities laws to the detriment of the shareholders of either 
corporation.124 This is a logical extension of the thesis that the true client 
of a corporate lawyer is not the entity but its shareholders, and perhaps 
members of the public as well. 125 
III. PRIVILEGED CoMMUNICATIONS 
Since the legal problems of corporate lawyers are so often disclosure 
problems, the principal ethical questions for lawyers that have surfaced 
recently and are likely to surface in the near future will also involve dis-
closure, and hence the issue of the attorney-client privilege. The 
American Bar Association opposes the legal development discussed in 
this Article, maintaining that a lawyer's responsibility is exclusively to 
the corporate entity which is his client, and that this important relation-
ship can be maintained properly only by asserting the doctrine that 
communications between a client and his attorney are privileged.126 
119 See Memorandum filed by Arnold & Porter as Counsel for certain defendants in 
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973). 
120 Id. 
121 A search of the literature has failed to disclose any comparable prior charge. But 
see SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973). 
122 See note 5 supra. 
123 Cf. SEC v. Century Investment Transfer Corp., [1971-72 TRANSFER BINDER] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) -~ 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971} (an attorney's opinion letters were in-
"consistent with a statute on its face and were used to facilitate the illegal distribution 
of unregistered securities. The court found his conduct "enough beyond a mere mistake 
in legal judgment to constitute a probable violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the 
securities Acts laws" and approved issue of a preliminary injunction). 
124 SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 296-99 (D.D.C. 1973). 
125 See Part II A-D of the text supra. 
128 See ABA STATEMENT OF PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107, 
31 Bus. LAw. at 54348. 
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The attorney-client privilege was discussed briefly in connection with 
Wolfinbarger but deserves further attention.127 
The policy behind the privilege is founded upon the subjective deter-
mination made in the eighteenth century that, to promote the freedom of 
legal consultations, apprehension of compelled disclosure must be re-
moved.128 Two hundred years later it may be appropriate to reexamine 
that subjective determination as applied to the modern public corpora-
tion.129 
"The beginning point," as the Fifth Circuit, citing Wigmore, stated in 
Wolfinbarger, "is the fundamental principle that the public has the right 
to every man's evidence, and that exemptions from the general duty to 
give testimony that one is capable of giving are distinctly exceptional."130 
Such exceptions are to be determined by "a balancing of interests 
between injury resulting from disclosure and the benefit gained in the 
correct disposal of litigation."131 
Wigmore sets forth four fundamental conditions recognized as neces-
sary to the establishment of a privilege not to disclose confidential 
communications.132 All of these four conditions must be present for a 
privilege to be recognized, 133 and two are pertinent here: 
I. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the 
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the 
parties. 
2. The injury that would inure to the relationship by the 
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the bene-
fit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.134 
However, the ethical disclosure problems of corporate lawyers rarely 
involve litigation, except for stockholder derivative suits, so that a 
broadening reformulation of Wigmore's second condition in a manner 
consistent with the thesis presented in this Article will be useful for 
analysis.135 Wigmore's modified second condition would read as 
follows: 
127 See the discussion of Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) in the 
text accompanying notes 54-66 supra. 
128 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (rev. ed., J. McNaughton 1961). 
129 See Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), in which the court made 
a similar analysis but on the more limited question of the rights of shareholder plaintiff 
in a derivative suit to access to privileged communications. 
130 Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, llOO (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, 
supra note 128, at§ 2192). 
131 Gamer v. WoJfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, ll01 (5th Cir. 1970). 
132 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 128, at § 2285. The two conditions not discussed in 
the text are that the communication must originate in a confidence that it will not be dis-
closed and the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be 
sedulously fostered. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. (Emphasis in original). 
135 Compare the discussion in Part III of this article with ABA Code EC 7-3, 7-4, 7-5. 
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2. The injury that would inure to the corporate attorney-
client relationship by the disclosure of the communication must 
be greater than the benefit gained thereby for the protection of 
significant interests of the shareholders of the corporation or 
the public. 136 
Determining the "public interest" may not always be easy. For pur-
poses of this discussion the "protection of the public interest" will be 
defined as the prevention or uncovering of a crime or fraud which may 
have a materially adverse effect on a significant interest of the share-
holders of a corporation or the general public. 
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility 
The American Bar Association has continued to resist any expansion 
of lawyers' professional responsibilities by maintaining that a lawyer's 
sole responsibility is to his own client, which in the case of a corporation 
is the corporate entity, and by asserting the doctrine of attorney-client 
privilege. 137 The corporate entity theory has been discussed above. 
In the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, the attorney-client privi-
lege is interposed between what might without the Code be termed a 
lawyer's ethical duty to disclose wrongdoing, and his ability 'to fulfill that 
duty without violating the Code's provisions. This is accomplished 
primarily through two Disciplinary Rules in the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states in part: 
(B) Except when permitted under DR4-101(C}, a lawyer shall 
not knowingly: 
(1} Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvan-
tage of the client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advan-
tage of himself or of a third person, unless the client 
consents after full disclosure. 
(C) A lawyer may reveal: 
(1} Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or 
clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disci-
plinary Rules or required by law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the 
information necessary to prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or col-
lect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or as-
sociates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.138 
136 See the discussion of the possible duty of the corporate lawyer to the public, and 
the conflict between that duty and his duty to his principle client in parts III, D, E of the 
text supra. 
137 See ABA STATEMENT OF PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107. 
138 ABA Code DR 4-lOl(B), (C). 
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Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states in part: 
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) 
His client, has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated 
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his 
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable 
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or trib-
unal except when the information is protected as a privileged 
communication.139 
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Moreover, while an attorney may not violate the attorney-client priv-
ilege in order to disclose corporate wrongdoing affecting the sharehold-
ers or the public, he may disregard the privilege in order to establish 
or collect his fee. 140 This reflects a strange ordering of values, and 
yields an inconsistent result under Wigmore's modified second condi-
tion. 
B. Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information 
The conflict that can arise between the need for public disclosure by 
counsel and the inhibitions imposed on that disclosure by attorney-
client privilege as expressed in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity141 is illustrated by a policy recently formulated by the ABA regarding 
lawyers' responses to auditors' requests for information. A preliminary 
report, drafted by the ABA in 1974, observed that the American "legal, 
political and economic systems depend to an important extent on pub-
lic confidence in published financial statements."142 These statements 
are accompanied by the opinion of an independent certified public ac-
countant that he has examined the statements and found them to 
"fairly present the financial condition of the company and the results 
of its operations for the period included in the financial statements in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."143 
To meet professional auditing standards in this examination, the 
accountant is required to obtain sufficient competent evidence to afford 
a reasonable basis for his opinion, 144 and evidence obtained from 
sources outside the company provide greater assurance of reliability. 145 
The corporate lawyer is one of those independent sources.146 If the ac-
countant is unable to complete these procedures satisfactorily, he must 
139 Id. at DR 7-102 B(1). The italicized phrase was added in 1974. See ABA, MIDYEAR 
MEETING, SUMMARY AND REPORTS 3 (1974). 
140 ABA Code DR 4-101(C)(4). 
141 See text accompanying note 138 supra. 
142 ABA SECI10N OF CoRPoRATE, BANKING AND BusiNESS LAw, ScoPE OF LAWYERS' 
RESPONSES TO AUDITORS' REQUESTS FOR iNFORMATION (rev. exposure draft Aug. 1974), 
reprinted in 30 Bus. LAw. 513, 515 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT ON AuDrroRS' 
REQUESTS]. 
143 Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 520. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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qualify his opinion or issue a disclaimer of opinion. 147 Such an opmwn 
will not be acceptable to the SEC in connection with the public offering 
of securities.148 Therefore, the failure of a lawyer to respond properly 
to an auditor's request for information could have serious consequences 
for the corporation. In recent years, accountants have broadened their 
request for information from attorneys to include not only a description 
and evaluation of present litigation, impending litigation, and asserted 
claims, but also of unasserted contingent claims of which the attorney 
has knowledge. 149 This development has concerned the American Bar 
Association because complete compliance with such an auditor's re-
quest could impinge on the attorney-client privilege.150 r As a result of 
discussions between representatives of the two professions, a mutually 
acceptable procedure was adopted, 151 purportedly recognizing both 
the importance of public confidence in published financial statements 
and the Heed to maintain the confidentiality of the lawyer-client re-
lationship.152 
The accountant does not request information directly from the attor-
ney. Rather, the client at the auditor's direction asks his counsel to fur-
nish the company's accountants with certain information. This request 
could constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 153 though 
given somewhat under duress because of pressure from the accountant, 
provided counsel assures himself that the client understands the conse-
quences of the disclosure in providing an informed consent.154 
Furnishing responses with respect to asserted claims and pending 
litigation created no problem in this regard. 155 The principle area of conflict 
involved contingent liabilities for unasserted claims. In the ABA's view, the 
disclosure of such matters might stimulate claims or lawsuits and cut off the 
free flow of information from clients which is necessary for good legal 
advice.156 The conflict was generally resolved in favor of nondisclosure.157 
147 ld. 
148 I d., 30 Bus. LAw. at 521. 
149 ld., 30 Bus. LAw. at 524. 
1so I d., 30 Bus. LAw. at 521. 
151 AMERICAN BAR AssoclATION, STATEMENT OF PouCY REGARDING LAWYEHS' RE-
SPONSES TO AUDITOHS' REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (approved Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in 
31 Bus. LAw. 1709 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA PouCY REGARDING AunrmHS' RE-
QUESTS].- Guidelines for auditors and accountants are set forth in AICPA AUDITING 
STANDARDS EXECUTIVE CoMMITI'EE, INQUIRY oF A CUENT's LAWYER CoNCERNING LITI-
GATION, CLAIMS, AND AssESSMENTS (issued Jan. 1976), 1 AICPA PRoF. STANDS. REP. 
(CCH) AU § 337; and FINANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARDS BoARD, STATEMENT OF FI-
NANCIAL AccoUNTING STANDARDS No. 5: AccouNTING FOR CoNTINGENCIES, 3 AICPA 
PRoF. STANDS. REP. (CCH) AC § 4311. 
152 See ABA PouCY REGARDING AunrmHS' REQUESTS, supra note 151, 31 Bus. LAw. 
at 1709-10. 
153 Id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1716. 
154 ld., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1711, 1716. 
155 Id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1712. 
1511 See ABA REPORT ON AunrmHS' REQUESTS, supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 524. 
15~ See ABA PouCY REGARDING AuniTOHS' REQUESTS, supra note 151. 
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One type of unasserted claim is of special interest. This is a poten-
tial claim arising from the failure of the corporation to make an obliga-
tory public disclosure, which if discovered would clearly subject the 
corporation to material liability, despite the advice of counsel that such 
disclosure was obligatory .158 Under guidelines proposed in the 197 4 
ABA report, 159 an attorney who had given such advice could make an 
appropriate disclosure in response to an auditor's request for informa-
tion, provided that the obligatory public disclosure was not merely the 
advisable or preferred course, but was "of such importance and ser-
iousness that rejection by the client of such advice would in all proba-
bility require the lawyer's withdrawal from employment in accordance 
with the Code of Professional Responsibility."160 This guideline repre-
sented a change in the positions traditionally held by lawyers, 161 but 
unfortunately this enlightened view did not prevail in the final State-
ment of Policy. 162 Instead, the approved Statement of Policy notes that 
the lawyer should not knowingly participate in any violation by the 
client of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Acts, and that he 
may be required to resign in appropriate circumstances if his advice 
concerning disclosures is disregarded by the client. 163 This appears to 
do no more than apply the present ABA Code of Professional Respon-
sibility164 to securities lawyers. 
There is admittedly a genuine corporate interest in refraining from 
advertising claims which have not been asserted and which, unless brought to 
light by the client, may never be asserted. On the other hand, facts leading to 
potential claims by shareholders or the public seem an appropriate matter for 
disclosure, and in keeping with the previously discussed165 duty of the 
corporate lawyer to both groups. The client's request on behalf of the auditors 
contains a consent to disclosure, albeit a pressured consent. But without such 
pressures many corporations would reveal little, either to the auditors or to the 
public. Why then must the bar reach so far to protect a knowledgeable and 
consenting client from itself? The suspicion remains that the bar may be 
protecting lawyers as well as their clients.166 
C. Disclosure or Privilege 
To examine the validity of the ABA position that disclosures of privi-
158 See ABA REPORT oN AuDITORS' REQUESTS, supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 517. 
1s9 Id. 
160 Id. (emphasis in original). 
161 Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 513. Part IV of the Report summarizes comments express-
ing concern over the proposed policy, submitted by members of the ABA Section of 
Corporation, Banking and Business Law. Id., 30 Bus. LAw. at 529-30. 
162 See ABA PoLICY REGARDING AuDITORS' REQUESTS, supra note 151. 
163 Compare id., 31 Bus. LAw. at 1714, with ABA REPORT oN AuDITORS' REQUESTS, 
supra note 142, 30 Bus. LAw. at 517. 
164 See ABA Code DR 7-102 (A)(3), (7) and (8); DR 2-110(B)(2). 
165 See Part III C, D and E of the text. 
166 See ABA REPORT ON AunrroRS' REQUESTS, supra note 143, 30 Bus. LAw. at 524. 
358 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:325 
leged information by an attorney, even as to matters of significant 
shareholder or public interest, is never justified except as permitted 
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, it will be useful to test it 
against Wigmore's two conditions. 167 
The first condition requires that confidentiality must be essential 
to the relationship between the parties. Confidentiality between a 
corporation and its counsel is useful, but no more essential than among 
directors, officers, and key employees who are involved in the corporate 
decision-making process and whose communications are not privi-
leged.168 Information must be furnished to selected individuals in the 
corporate structure or else decisions could not be made. It appears 
unlikely that management will refuse to communicate confidential in-
formation to a more trusted, if unprivileged, advisor when his advice is 
considered important, and when such conferral may be an essential 
part of a due diligence defense to a civil or criminal action.169 An affir-
mative duty of disclosure by counsel should not seriously inhibit client 
communication, since counsel may at present reveal confidences to 
prevent present or future crimes, 170 and willful violations of the securi-
ties acts are crimes. 171 Nor should a corporate officer conferring with 
his advisors assume that only a lawyer would feel obliged to disclose 
significant corporate improprieties. In the absence of empirical data, 
it is possible only to speculate on the importance of confidentiality to 
the attorney-corporate client relationship, but perhaps the burden of 
proof should be on those who would assert the privilege.172 
Wigmore's modified second condition173 balances the benefits of 
disclosure to the shareholders and the public against the damaging 
effects of such disclosure upon the attorney-client relationship and the 
property rights of a large amorphous entity. Perhaps of even greater 
benefit to the public interest would be the restoration of confidence 
in the integrity of the bar as guardians of freedom, rather than as cor-
porate servants whose morality is measured by the actions of their 
clients. Moreover, it has been postulated herein174 that one of the in-
terests of shareholders is, as a matter of public policy, to have their 
corporation behave in a lawful manner. Nor is there any public or 
shareholder interest in allowing a corporation and its management to 
167 See text accompanying note 134 supra. 
168 See the discussion of privilege in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 128, at §§ 2191, 
2286. 
169 Failure to use due diligence has included aiding and abetting a violation for false 
statements on securities registration. See In Re Equity Funding Corp. of America Secu-
rities Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976); In Re Caesars Palace Securities Liti-
gation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also note 74 supra. 
170 ABA Code DR 4-10l(C)(3), quoted in the text at note 138 supm. 
171 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(x) 78f(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
172 A carefully drawn empirical study of the need for the privilege in corporate 
lawyer-client relations might prove most useful. 
173 See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra. 
174 See text following note 64 supra. 
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consult an attorney, and then to ignore with impunity his advice that 
a present policy or proposed action of the corporation is improperP5 
This restoration of confidence in the bar requires among other 
things a change in the Code of Professional Responsibility with respect 
to matters of corporate disclosure. To take an extreme example, what 
must a lawyer do when his client tells him in confidence that he is go-
ing to plant a time bomb aboard TWA's flight 703 leaving New York 
for Paris next Sunday afternoon at 6:00 p.m.? Nothing, according to 
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which permits but does not re-
quire a lawyer to reveal his client's confidence in order to prevent a 
crime. 176 Presumably, all lawyers would contact the appropriate authori-
ties. It is less clear that a corporate lawyer will voluntarily inform the 
authorities upon learning in confidence that his client plans to file a 
criminally false report with the Civil Aeronautics Board, which the 
lawyer will not prepare or file, that a commercial passenger plane it is 
manufacturing meets the required safety standards. Still less likely is 
the possibility that a corporate lawyer would advise the Commission 
that in a corporate annual report on SEC Form 10K,177 which he 
neither prepared nor will file, his client will falsely state against his ad-
vice that the plane meets all federal safety standards. These are dif-
ferences of degree and not principle. Disclosure should be mandatory 
in each instance. The attorney clearly may not knowingly assist in the 
preparing or filing of a false report, 178 and given the previously postu-
lated duty to the shareholders and to the public, he should not silently 
tolerate such conduct even where he has not personally prepared the 
report. 
Assume further that the attorney learned of the false statements af-
ter the documents have been filed and processed, but before there has 
been an accident or any securities have been sold. As before, assume 
that the lawyer was not responsible for the preparation of the docu-
ments. The client no longer intends to commit a crime; the crime has 
already been committed, though it will have a future effect. Under the 
Disciplinary Rules, the attorney would not be permitted to make disclo-
sure of the privileged information, 179 yet the public interest would 
seem to require disclosure. Even in the more difficult situation in which 
the attorney learns of the false statements after the first plane has 
crashed or securities have been sold in reliance upon the false financial 
statements, should not the lawyer speak before the second plane 
crashes or additional securities are sold? The Disciplinary Rules say 
"no."180 If the defective planes have been grounded or the securities 
offering has been completed, then there is no future harm to be pre-
175 See Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1973). 
11a ABA Code DR 4-lOl(C). 
177 17 C.F.R. ~ 249.310 (1976). 
178 ABA Code EC 7-5. It would also constitute aiding and abetting. 
!79 ABA Code DR 4-101. 
18o Id. 
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vented, and disclosure would primarily affect prospective litigation and 
should not be made. However, if the attorney unknowingly assisted in 
the preparation of the false documents, then, since the fraud was com-
mitted "in the course of the [attorney's] representation" and "upon a 
person or tribunal," the attorney must with one significant exception 
reveal the fraud if his client refuses to do so.181 The exception is that 
counsel may not reveal the fraud when the information is protected as 
a privileged communication, 182 even as planes crash and investors are 
defrauded. 
This discussion of the shortcomings of the present Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility is not to say that the attorney-client relationship 
is not important in the corporate setting, but rather that the attorney-
client privilege should not have continued viability in those areas in 
which there are prevailing and conflicting shareholder or public inter-
ests.183 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
The present ethical mode of the corporate bar, as this Article has 
demonstrated, is under increasing challenge by the SEC and the courts. 
The lawyer-corporate client relationship, important as it may be, cannot 
continue to defeat public expectations of responsible professional con-
duct. As the Fifth Circuit remarked about the ABA brief in W olfin-
barger, it "does not always distinguish clearly between the separate 
interests of the corporate client and the attorney in freedom from dis-
closure, nor is it always possible to do so."184 However, any concern 
of the bar that stricter standards might result in increased exposure of 
its members to civil liabilities for negligence under Rule lOb-5 was 
removed by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 185 
Perhaps a lessening of the bar's resistance to reform may follow. 
If the bar is brought to reform by the courts and the SEC, there will 
be a long period of uncertainty due to the conflict between the ·code of 
Professional Responsibility, with its reliance on the corporate entity 
theory and the privileged attorney-corporate client relationship, and 
the developments in the courts and the SEC. Nor will the bar's image 
181 ABA Code DR 7-102(B)(1). See note 138 supra. It is not clear whether "tribunal" 
would include an administrative agency acting in its administrative rather than judicial 
capacity. 
1s2 Id. 
183 Compare ABA STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 
107, with Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970). 
184 430 F.2d at 1102. The ABA's position was that the privilege is most necessary 
where a lawyer furnishes a corporation his opinion that a prospective transaction is not 
lawful but the corporation disregards his advice. Counsel, urged the ABA, must be free 
to state his opinion without fear of later disclosure and without the privilege counsel 
might in the words of the brief, be "required by the threat of future discovery to hedge 
or soften their opinions." This is still very much the ABA's position. See ABA STATEMENT 
of PoLICY REGARDING SEC CoMPLIANCE, supra note 107. 
"
5 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See note 101 supra. 
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be enhanced by a prolonged resistance to reform evidenced by reluc-
tance to amend the Code. 
Several proposed changes in the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, designed to meet some of the needs for higher standards forseen 
by this Article with a minimum of disruption of traditional values, are 
set forth below, followed by brief commentary. 
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 4-lOl(E), (F), (G), and (H) 
DR 4-101 186 (E) A lawyer for a public corporation shall re-
veal the intention of the corporation or any of its officers or di-
rectors (individually or on behalf of the corporation) by an act 
or omission to act: 
( 1) to commit a crime and the information necessary to 
prevent the crime. 
(2) to commit a fraud, tort, or act of questionable legality 
materially and adversely affecting the shareholders of the cor-
poration. 
(F) A lawyer for a public corporation shall reveal a crime 
which has already been committed by the corporation or any 
of its officers or directors (individually or on behalf of the cor-
poration) if the failure to disclose the crime may have a mate-
rial adverse effect in the future on a significant interest of the 
public or of the shareholders of the corporation. 
(G) The provisions of DR 4-101 (E) (2) and (F) shall not 
apply to confidential communications made with respect to 
overtly threatened or pending litigation. 187 
(H) 188 A lawyer shall not make the revelations required 
by DR 4-101 (E) and (F) until he has advised the appropriate 
officers and the board of directors of his advice concerning the 
proposed or continuing course of action or refusal to act, which 
advice in his opinion reflects the required and not merely the 
advisable or preferred course, and that the matter is of such 
importance and seriousness that rejection by the client of the 
advice would in all probability require the lawyer's withdrawal 
from employment and his advising of the appropriate authori-
ties in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, 
and the officers or board of directors have failed to take appro-
priate corrective action after a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
First and foremost, these sections make the lawyer's obligation to 
disclose a client's intended crime mandatory rather than permissive.189 · 
186 These are new sections to replace ABA Code DR 4-10l(C)(3) with respect to 
public corporate clients. 
187 Under the original theory of the attorney-client privilege only communications 
received after the beginning of litigation were considered confidential. 8 J. WIGMORE, 
supra note 128, § 2290 at 544. 
188 This is a new section. 
189 See Part IV C of the text. 
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Subsection (E)(l) extends the lawyer's obligation to disclose intended 
crimes of officers and directors of the corporation, to avoid such ques-
tions as whether the officer or director was acting within the scope of 
his authority. The provision is not intended to change the lawyer's 
obligation as to completely unrelated crimes, such as the vice presi-
dent's intention to beat up his wife when he gets home. Subsection (E) 
(2) carries out the thesis expressed in Part III of this Article by requir-
ing counsel to disclose to shareholders frauds, torts, or acts of question-
able legality-acts which might give rise to stockholder derivative suits 
or shareholder doubts about the integrity of management, such as par-
ticipation in corporate bribery. Disclosure is also required of past crimes 
when the failure to disclose could work a significant future harm to 
the shareholders or to the public. 19° For example, if a corporate lawyer 
learns in confidence that his client has filed a materially false annual 
report on form lOK with the SEC, which the lawyer did not prepare, 
but upon which shareholders and members of the investing public will 
continue to rely for some time to come, he would be under an obligation 
to disclose the false filing. However, subparagraph (H) has been added 
to make it clear that the matter must be of considerable importance, 
and that in the lawyer's opinion the recommended remedial action must 
clearly be required. His opinion must be brought home directly to the 
appropriate officers and the board before he makes any disclosure. Ex-
cept in rare instances, a corporation is not likely to disregard such ad-
vice and thereby force a disclosure, so the threat must be used with 
caution by attorneys and with confidence that they are right. Economic 
self-interest in a continuing retainer with the client should adequately 
restrain counsel, except in circumstances in which the facts of the 
situation and the reluctance of the client to follow professional advice 
make conflict inevitable. These changes would not apply to privileged 
communications in pending or overtly threatened litigation. 
Proposed Ethical Consideration 5-18 
EC 5-18191 A lawyer employed or retained by a public 
corporation owes his allegiance to all of the shareholders as a 
group, qua shareholders, and not to the corporate entity nor 
to any director, officer, employee, representative, or other person 
connected with the corporation; but in his representation the 
lawyer shall take his instructions solely from the board of di-
rectors as the elected representatives of the shareholders, and 
from the officers of the corporation chosen by such board. In 
the normal course of business the interests of the shareholders 
qua shareholders will be co-extensive, provided however that 
when there may be differing interests among the shareholders 
a lawyer may follow the instructions of the board of directors 
so long as it does not require him to assist the corporation in 
190 Id. 
191 This replaces the first two sentences of ABA Code EC 5-18. See note 5 supra. 
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performing an act described in subsections (1) or (2) of DR 
4-101(E). 
363 
This Ethical Consideration is an outgrowth of the point of view ex-
pressed in Part III of this Article, and provides a rationale for the dis-
closure obligations imposed on lawyers by proposed sections DR 4-101 
(E) and (F). A shareholder-director who proposes to enter into an agree-
ment with the corporation does so as an individual and not qua share-
holder. Occasions may arise where the economic interest of the con-
trolling shareholders of the corporation is different than other stock-
holders, and this dilemma is resolved by allowing the attorney to follow 
the instructions of the board, subject to his disclosure obligations under 
these proposed rules. 
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 7-lOl(C) 
DR 7-101(C) 192 In his representation of a public corporation a 
lawyer shall refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to 
be unlawful even though. there is some support for an argument that 
the conduct is legal. 
The word "may" in present DR 7-101(B}(2) has been changed to 
"shall" so that a lawyer cannot be put in the anamolous position of 
being required under proposed DR 4-101(E) to disclose corporate con-
duct ih which he assisted despite his personal belief that such conduct 
was unlawful. 
Proposed Disciplinary Rule 7-102(C) 
DR 7-102(C) 193 A lawyer for a public corporation who re-
ceives information clearly establishing that the corporation in 
the course of the representation commited a fraud upon a per-
son, tribunal, or administrative agency shall promptly call 
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or 
is unable to do so, he shall promptly reveal the fraud to the 
affected person, tribunal, or agency. 
(1} 194 If disclosure to the affected persons is not practical, 
then disclosure to an appropriate governmental authority may 
be made instead. 
The purpose of the change is to make the section applicable to ad-
ministrative agencies, not sitting as a tribunal, and to provide a viable 
192 This is a new section to replace ABA Code EC 7-101(B)(2) with respect to public 
corporate clients. 
193 This is a new section to replace ABA Code DR 7-102(B)(1) with respect to public 
corporate clients, and would remove the privilege exception added to that subsection 
in 1974 as to such clients. For the present version of this rule, see the text accompany-
ing note 139 supra. See also ABA Code, EC 7-26, 7-27. 
19< This is a new section. 
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mechanism for disclosure when a fraud is perpetrated on all of the 
shareholders of a corporation or the public at large. 
V. CoNcLusioN 
The revlSlons of the Code of Professional Responsibility suggested 
in this Article reflect trends in the regulation of corporate lawyers by the 
SEC and the courts. These changes will not in practice tum a corpora-
tion's counsel into a tattler, but will give him an effective veto over 
certain improper corporate acts. What the bar will not do for itself 
others will eventually do for it. Strong and mature counsel, by the na-
ture of their relationships with their clients, have long had a practical 
veto over their clients' acts if they have chosen to exercise it, and obser-
vation would indicate that they usually have. However, the weaker or 
less scrupulous lawyers must be given firm guidelines. The standards 
of all must be raised to what hopefully are already the standards of the 
many, and the lawyer-client privilege should not stand as an obstacle 
to lawyers in their quest for a higher ethic. 
